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Remuneration for Home Copying: 
A Controversial Directive Remains Elusive 
INTRODUCTION 
Home taping is the private, non-commercial copying of audio and 
video material.! A debate has emerged that has centered around whether 
copyright owners should be compensated by way of a levy on blank 
tapes and audiovisual equipment for alleged losses to them caused by 
home taping.2 A draft directive on home copying would guarantee the 
creators of musical compositions and films payment of copyright on 
home copying of their works and would establish a uniform levy on 
blank audio and video cassettes and recording equipment in all Euro-
pean Union (EU) Member States.3 
The draft has been gathering dust on the European Commission's 
(Commission) shelves for over three years.4 The Council of Ministers 
(Council)5 and the Commission,6 as well as the Member States, have 
been divided over this issue.7 Currently, the United Kingdom (UK), 
Ireland and Luxembourg lack any system of protection against home 
copying, and the systems in effect in other Member States vary widely.8 
The UK has criticized the proposal, as have European manufacturers 
and importers of tapes and consumer electronics who fear the effect 
of rising prices.9 Critics claim that the levies penalize all consumers of 
1 THE HOME TAPING RiGHTS CAMPAIGN, THE CASE AGAINST LEVIES 1 (1992) [hereinafter CASE 
AGAINST LEVIES]. 
2 Michael Hart, Home Taping: the Downfall of the Tape Levy, COMPUTER L. & PRAC., Sept.-Oct. 
1988, at 8. 
3 Home Copying: Commission to Propose System of Taxes, European Information Service, Sept. 6, 
1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, AIlnws File [hereinafter Home Copying]. 
4Id. 
5 The Council makes the major policy decisions of the European Union. It is composed of six 
ministers, who change according to the issue being addressed. GEORGE A. BERMANN, ET AL., CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 51 (1993). 
6 The Commission initiates proposals and implements EU policy. Each country nominates 
members to serve four-year terms. Id. at 57. 
7 Copyright: Difficult Move Towards Blank Tape Tax, European Information Service, Oct. 8, 1992, 
available in LEXIS, World Library, AIlnws File [hereinafter Copyright]. 
8 Home Copying, supra note 3. 
9 See Andrew Marshall, Discord in Moves to Harmonize Tape Levy, THE INDEPENDENT, Aug. 22, 
1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, AIlwld File [hereinafter Marshall]. 
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blank tape and recording equipment, regardless of how the equipment 
is used.1O On the other hand, the film and music industries and na-
tional copyright associations favor a directive that would reimburse 
copyright owners for breaches of that rightY The Commission esti-
mates that forty percent of the blank tapes in the EU are used to violate 
authors' rights, and the consequential loss of revenue is substantial,l2 
Furthermore, the Commission hopes to remove the obstacle to the free 
movement of blank tapes and audiovisual equipment that has resulted 
from different national legislations. 13 
Part I of this Note recalls the origins and legal bases of remunera-
tion, or compensation for home copying. Part II addresses the differ-
ences in national legislation in the EU Member States, and the effect 
of harmonization. Part III discusses the arguments for and against the 
EU proposal. Part IV will analyze whether the current proposal will be 
adopted and its subsequent impact. Finally, this Note concludes that 
the current proposal has attempted to satisfy too many interests and 
no longer attempts to harmonize legislation, which may cause its down-
fall. 
1. THE HISTORY AND LEGAL BASIS OF 
REMUNERATION FOR HOME COPYING 
In 1949, the International Confederation of Societies of Authors and 
Composers (CISAC) first discussed the idea of protecting the rights of 
authors through the statutory grant of remuneration calculated on 
recording equipment and blank tapes, when their works are used or 
reproduced for personal or private use. 14 Although the CISAC recognized 
that the current methods of reproducing intellectual works could re-
sult in infringement of authors' rights, its recommendation that new 
solutions should be developed in order to protect the legitimate inter-
ests of authors was not pursued. 15 It was not until the 1967 revision of 
\0 CASE AGAINST LEVIES, supra note 1, at 3. 
II Amelia Torres, EU Commission to Propose Levies on Home Copying of Tapes, The Reuter 
Business Report, Aug. 17, 1994, available in LEXlS, World Library, Allnws File [hereinafter Torres, 
EU Commission]. 
12 EU Commission Delays Vote on Harmonizing Levies on Tapes, Daily Report for Execu-
tives(BNA), Sept. 13, 1994, available in LEXlS, Lglnws Library, Curnws File [hereinafter EU 
Commission Delays Vote]. 
13 See Home Copying, supra note 3. 
14 Taddeo Collova, La remuneration pour copie privee [The Remuneration for Private Copying], 
149 REVUE INTERNATIONALE Du DROIT D'AUTEUR 35, 36 (1991). 
15Id. at 38. 
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the Berne Convention (Berne)16 that the author's exclusive right to 
authorize the reproduction of his or her works in any manner or form 
was recognized as the general right of reproductionY 
Berne did not deal explicitly with the issue of home copying. IS It did 
provide in Article 9 (2), however, that home copying was a matter for 
national legislation to permit reproduction in certain special cases, 
provided that the reproduction did not conflict with a normal exploi-
tation of the work and did not unreasonably prejudice the author's 
legitimate interests.19 Furthermore, the language of Article 9(2) im-
plies that the exception is inconsistent with Berne unless the with-
drawal of the author's exclusive right is combined with appropriate 
financial compensation.20 Accordingly, most Member States have en-
acted legislation introducing levies to provide remuneration for acts of 
home copying. 21 There is no trend among Member States expressly 
permitting home copying without remuneration. 22 
Harmonization of existing national legislation at the EU level has 
been difficult.23 On January 26, 1988, the Council published a Recom-
mendation24 in favor of the introduction of authors' rights to remu-
neration for sound and audiovisual private copying of their works.25 
Conversely, the Commission seemed ambivalent about levies on blank 
recording tapes in its 1988 "Green Paper on Copyright and the Chal-
lenge of Technology," which was its first attempt to introduce a coher-
ent legislative framework for copyrights in the EU.26 The Commission 
16 The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works was concluded in 
1886 and was last amended in 1979. Protection of Intellectual Property Rights: Berne Convention of 
September 9, 1886 for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Basic Documents of Int'l Econ. 
L., 1990, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Bdiel File [hereinafter Protection of Intellectual Property 
Rights]. It strives to protect the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works. See id. As of 
January 1, 1988, 77 states were party to the Convention. Id. 
17 Collova, supra note 14, at 40. 
18 Copyright and the Challenge of Technology: Green Paper from the Commission, 
COM(88) 172 final at 103 [hereinafter Green Paper]. 
19 Collova, supra note 14, at 40. At the Convention, it was stressed that the development of 
modern reproduction processes in the private sector threatened to dilute the author's reproduc-
tion right. Id. at 80. Even though the reference to special cases is not specified, it cannot include 
the majority of cases or else the right would be negated. Id. at 82. 
20Id. 
21 Id. at 46-56. 
22 Green Paper, supra note 18, at 103. 
23 See Home Copying, supra note 3. 
24 Collova, supra note 14, at 56. 
25Id. 
26 See Green Paper, supra note 18, at 132. The Commission, however, did recognize that home 
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changed its original position after holding a hearing and asking for 
submissions from interested parties regarding the issues presented in 
the Green Paper.27 Subsequently, in 1991, the Commission released a 
"Follow-up to the Green Paper" in which it argued in favor of new 
legislation on home copying at the EU level,28 The Commission also 
committed itself to drafting a proposal for a directive on home copying.29 
In September 1992, the Commission forwarded a proposal to the 
Council to impose a levy on audio and video "blank recording media," 
as well as recording equipment.3o Under this proposal, a single rate 
would be set for each product, to be paid by manufacturers and 
importers and distributed to authors and performers through collec-
tive management companies.3l This proposal initially failed to gain 
support among the EU ministers.32 Finally, however, at a November 10, 
1992 meeting of the Council, the idea elicited a favorable response, 
and the Commission decided to draft a directive.33 The Commission 
has never formally unveiled this draft.34 Newspapers, however, have 
reported on its contents over the last three years.35 Although the Com-
mission was scheduled to vote on the directive at the end of September 
1994,36 it has repeatedly delayed such action.37 
II. DIFFERENCES IN NATIONAL LEGISLATION 
A number of factors may be responsible for disparities in national 
legislation on home copying.38 They include: (1) determining the basis 
copying could prejudice the interests of right holders, so they encouraged technical measures to 
limit the scope of the copying facility of digital audio machines. ld. at 136. 
27 Follow-up to the Green Paper: Working Programme of the Commission in the Field of 
Copyright and Neighboring Rights, Com(90)584 final at 11-12. 
281d. at 13. 
291d. 
30 See Copyright, supra note 7. 
311d. 
321d. 
33 Coopers & Lybrand, E.C. Commentaries, Intellectual Property RepMt, §8, Oct. 27, 1994, 
available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Eurscp File. 
34 See Judy Jones & Martin Wroe, Tape Levy Threatens Newspapers fM the Blind, THE INDE-
PENDENT, Aug. 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File [hereinafter Jones & 
Wroe]. 
351d. 
36 EU Commission Delays Vote, supra note 12. 
37 Amelia Torres, Commission Plans For Rnyalties on Blank Tapes Bogged Down, The Reuter 
European Community Report, Oct. 5, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File 
[hereinafter Torres, Commission Plans]. 
38 Collova, supra note 14, at 58. 
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on which the remuneration is calculated; (2) specifYing that the remu-
neration is of a private nature and that right owners should receive the 
proceeds; (3) eliminating the employment of proceeds for public use; 
and (4) assimilating foreign right owners to national ones and respect-
ing the principle of equal treatment.39 Thus, these factors must be 
addressed if home copying legislation is harmonized at the community 
leve1.40 
The reproduction of intellectual works for private use constitutes a 
method of use which comes under the author's reproduction rights.41 
Additionally, pursuant to Berne, Member States cannot leave authors 
without adequate protection in connection with the reproduction of 
their works.42 Therefore, in determining the specific provisions that are 
needed to give that protection, one must consider the basis on which 
the remuneration is calculated.43 With respect to the legislatures that 
have already enacted specific provisions for remuneration of home 
copying, Germany, Spain, and Portugal have opted for a system in 
which the remuneration is payable on blank mediums and recording 
equipment.44 France bases the remuneration solely on blank mediums.45 
In order to harmonize EU law in this area, there must be a uniform 
basis for calculating the remuneration.46 Either all Member States must 
base the remuneration on both mediums and equipment, or Member 
States that have already established the dual basis for remuneration 
must amend their legislation to include just one.47 The effect of Mem-
ber States maintaining inconsistent laws regarding the basis of remu-
neration will be the non-harmonization and persistent distortion of 
competition in the single market.48 If manufacturers or importers of 
blank tapes or recording equipment market their products in a Mem-
ber State where the remuneration rate is high, they are at a competitive 
disadvantage compared with those in another Member State where the 
renumeration rate is low or non-existent.49 
39 [d. 
40 See id. 
41 [d. at 60. 
42 [d. 
43 See Collova, supra note 14, at 66. 
44 Green Paper, supra note 18, at 105-06. 
45 [d. 
46 Collova, supra note 14, at 68. 
47 [d. 
48 [d. 
49 Copyright, supra note 7. 
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Secondly, EU legislation must specify that remuneration is a private 
right, pursuant to the general right of reproduction, and that right 
owners should receive the proceeds. 50 Currently, some states maintain 
an inconsistent position, using proceeds for public use.51 Austria was 
the first European country to pass a provision which allocated a sub-
stantial portion of the collected proceeds for social welfare, rather than 
a direct remuneration to right owners.52 Arguably, this type of provision 
is within the spirit of Berne and encourages other States to enact 
remuneration legislation in order to benefit from the "partial sociali-
zation" of royalties.53 That an otherwise valid regulation under Berne 
stipulates that part of the remuneration must be used for social and/ or 
cultural purposes does not necessarily mean that the regulation con-
travenes Berne.54 Conversely, if social institutions funded with royalties 
do not belong in the copyright sphere, they should not be funded by 
copyright derived monies.55 Even if remuneration for private copying 
does fall within Berne, it does not necessarily lead to the conclusion 
that the implementation of a system that allocates the proceeds to 
social institutions also does.56 
Arguably, the allocation of funds for public good is an outgrowth of 
the already established practice of authors' societies deducting ten 
percent of royalties for authors' social funds, which dates back more 
than fifty years.57 The authors agree to this deduction themselves, and 
fellow authors are named beneficiaries.58 This practice cannot be com-
pared to the automatic deduction which would be imposed by the EU.59 
In effect, the EU deduction would transform rights of private interests 
into rights of public interest.6o The involvement of social institutions 
funded by royalties is not within the copyright sphere, and therefore, 
50 Canova, supra note 14, at 58. 
51 See id. at 46-56. 
52Id. at 108. 
53Id. at 112, citing Dillenz, La remuneration pour copie privee et le principe du traitement national, 
LE DROIT D'AuTEuR,june 1990, at 196. 
54 Id., citing Walter, Die Grundsatze des Konventionsrechts vor dem Hintergrund del' neueren 
urheberrechtlichen Entwicklungen, Osgrum 1988, vol. 7, at 238. 
55 Canova, supra note 14, at 116. 
56Id. at 114-15. 
57 See id. at 120. 
58Id. at 122. 
59Id. 
60 canova, supra note 14, at 122. 
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does not have a legal foundation within this context.61 Currently, na-
tionallegislation differs as to the allocation of the remuneration funds.62 
Finally, one must consider assimilating foreign right owners with 
national ones and respecting the principle of equal treatment.63 Article 
5(1) of Berne indicates that States should grant nationals of other 
countries the same rights as those granted to national authors.64 Na-
tional treatment is applicable to those rights which are recognized as 
authors' rights by virtue of Berne.65 Therefore, the exclusive right of 
reproduction should receive national treatment because it is an author's 
right under Berne.66 
Since the basis of the remuneration for home copying is the repro-
duction right, the prevention of foreign authors from sharing in the 
distribution of the proceeds from private copying contravenes the 
national treatment provision in BerneY Nevertheless, not all countries 
are signatories to Berne,68 and in recent years, unwritten exceptions to 
Berne's underlying policy of national treatment have emerged in the 
copyright laws of some Berne-member countries.6g Currently, national 
legislation varies as to whether foreign authors are entitled to receive 
a share of the remuneration. 70 
61 Id. at 116. 
62Jn Austria, the larger part of the proceeds (51 % lis required to be used for social welfare 
purposes rather than all the proceeds being allocated directly to right owners. Id. at 108. In 
France, the administration societies are required to use 25% of the proceeds to promote creation 
and live entertainment. Id. at 50. In Germany, the remuneration is still for the exclusive benefit 
of right owners. Id. at 48. 
63 Collova, supra note 14, at 58. 
64Id. at 126. 
65Id. at 118, citing Burger, The New Photocopy Remuneration Provisions in the Federal Republic 
of Germany and Their Application to Foreign Authors Under International Copyright Law, IIV 1988, 
488,495. 
66Id. 
67 Id., citing Ndiaye, L'administration collective des droits en generale, presented at the Copyright 
Seminar organized by WIPO and the Copyright Office, Washington, September 17-25, 1990. 
68 For example, the United States is not a member of the Berne Convention. Protection of 
Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 16. 
69 National Treatment Under Berne is Subject of House Panel Hearing, 46 PAT. TRADEMARK & 
COPYRIGHT J. 116, 116 (1993) [hereinafter National Treatment]. An example of this is France's 
legislation regarding home copying remuneration. Id. It denies United States copyright owners 
access to the royalties collected from the levy. Id. They base the law on the principle of reciprocity. 
Id. The United States lacks a comparable law and, according to the French, the works involved 
are not Berne-protected works. Id. 
70 In Portugal, foreign authors are not entitled to receive a share of the remuneration. Collova, 
supra note 14, at 50. 
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III. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST HARMONIZATION 
In its 1985 White Paper on intellectual property rights,?1 the Com-
mission stated that differences in legislation have an immediate nega-
tive impact on trade in the EU and the ability of business to regard the 
common market as a whole.72 In EMI/Electrola GmbH v. Patricia Im-und 
Export Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH (EMI/Electrola), the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) explicitly dealt with the lack of harmonization of 
national laws as a source of restriction of the free movement of goods.73 
The Court stated: 
In so far as the disparity between national laws may give rise 
to restrictions on intra-Community trade ... , such restric-
tions are justified under Article 36 of the [EEC] Treaty if they 
are the result of differences between the rules governing the 
[specific copyright provision] and this is inseparably linked 
to the very existence of the exclusive rights. 74 
EMI/Electrola and its progeny illustrate that the goal of the EEC 
Treaty to create a common market cannot be attained with respect to 
protected intellectual property rights as long as national laws substan-
tially differ.75 Since the 1988 Green Paper, the Commission has passed 
a series of directives, not only to harmonize but also to strengthen 
copyright laws in the EU.76 The only draft directive that has not been 
unveiled, however, is the directive on home copying of sound and 
71 Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European Coun-
cil, COM(85)310 def. 
72 Herman CohenJehoram, Harmonizing Intellectual Property Law Within the European Commu-
nity, 23 INT'L. REv. INDUS. PROP. COPYRIGHT 622, 622 (1992). 
73 Case 341/87, EMI Electrola GmbH v. Patricia Im-und Export Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH, 
79 E.C.R. 39 (1989). The legal term of protection of certain sound recordings had expired in 
Denmark, but not yet in Germany. Jehoram, supra note 72, at 624-25. The consent of the right 
owner was no longer required for distributing the recordings in Denmark. Id. When a third party 
distributed the recordings without consent, the right owner relied on his rights in Germany to 
request an injunction against the unauthorized importation of his records into Germany which 
had already been sold legally without his consent in Denmark. Id. 
74Jehoram, supra note 72, at 625 (quoting EMl/Electrola 79 E.C.R. 39). 
75Id. 
76Id. at 627. These directives include: harmonization of the term of protection of copyright 
and certain neighboring rights; coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and neigh-
boring rights applicable to satellite and cable broadcasting; harmonization of the legal protection 
of databases, rental right, lending and certain neighboring rights; and a decision that all Member 
States will ratity or adhere to the 1971 Paris Act of the Berne Convention and the Rome 
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audiovisual recordings.77 It has been extremely controversial due to 
conflicting industry interests.78 
There are three potential arguments in opposition to the implemen-
tation of a harmonized levy.79 First, a harmonized levy would cause the 
price of blank cassettes and equipment to increase.8o Officials in the 
manufacturing industry claim that the levy will be passed on to the 
consumer and prices of blank tapes could rise by more than sixty 
percent.8l Conversely, the Music Copyright Reform Group (MCRG), 
which represents composers, songwriters, lyricists, and publishers and 
favors harmonization, claims that such a levy will not have any impact 
on prices.82 In fact, statistics indicate that prices have not increased in 
any of the nine EU countries that already impose such a levy.83 It 
appears that the imposition of the royalty has stimulated competition 
and cost-cutting among blank-tape manufacturers.84 
Second, a levy would be, in effect, a tax on the blind, since audio 
tapes are vital for sightless people.85 Opposition from the blind popu-
lation has curtailed previous efforts to impose such a levy.86 The Na-
tional Federation for the Blind argues that any levy would affect thou-
sands of blind people, many of them elderly and with low incomes.87 
Even if a directive contained an exemption for the blind, the cost of 
implementing and enforcing such an exemption would be overwhelm-
ing and would create confusion.88 Much of this confusion would be a 
result of no universally recognized system of certification for blindness 
or partial sight.89 
Convention of 1961. Trevor M. Cook, Copyright in the European Community, 2 LEGAL ISSUES OF 
EUR. INTEGRATION 67, 69 (1992). 
77 ld. at 76. 
78 ld. 
79 Marshall, supra note 9. 
80 ld. 
8l Torres, EU Commission, supra note 11. 
82 See Marshall, supra note 9. 
83 Laughing All the Way to the Blank, EVENING STANDARD, Nov. 26, 1993, available in LEXIS, 
World Library, Allwld File. 
84 ld. In France, Germany and Austria, the price has actually decreased. ld. 
85 Marshall, supra note 9. 
86 ld. 
87 Jones & Wroe, supra note 34. 
88 ld. 
89 ld. 
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The third argument is perhaps the strongest.90 If the levy is consid-
ered a tax, then the issue of whether or not the Commission has the 
right to impose it arises.91 Even if the Commission does have such 
power, one dissenting Member State could block the imposition of the 
tax.92 If it is not deemed a tax, however, and is considered an Internal 
Market rule, then the levy would be subject to qualified majority vot-
ing.93 Arguably, one industry and consumers compensating another 
industry for an unquantifiable loss is more in the nature of a fiscal 
measure rather than a copyright measure.94 Usually, the primary in-
fringer is the unauthorized copier, and the person entitled to damages 
is the copyright owner whose works are infringed.95 In this case, the 
levies will penalize all people who make, import or buy blank tapes and 
equipment, rather than the specific copyright infringers.96 Further-
more, in the context of home copying, it is impossible to determine 
whose work is being infringed, so all copyright owners will benefit from 
the levy even though their work may not have been infringed.97 
Conversely, there are three arguments which support the harmoni-
zation of the levy on blank tapes and audiovisual and sound equip-
ment. First, home taping deprives artists of the royalties normally paid 
when a piece of their work is purchased.98 Since it is seemingly impos-
sible to stop home taping, one response is to compensate the shortfall 
through the sales of equipment and tapes.99 The Commission has 
estimated that forty percent of the blank tapes sold in the EU are used 
to violate authors' rights. IOO The British Phonographic Industry (BPI) 
estimates that the music industry loses 140 million pounds a year in 
lost record sales.lO l 
Second, distortions in the application of the law between Member 
States also cause distortions in the royalties paid to authors in different 




94 CASE AGAINST LEVIES, supra note 1, at 7. 
95 [d. at 6. 
96 See id. 
97 [d. 
98 Marshall, supra note 9. 
99 [d. 
100 EU Commission Delays Vote, supra note 12. 
101 Sarah Lonsdale, EC's Home Taping Tax Set to Hit Our Wallets, THE OBSERVER, Aug. 22, 1993, 
available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. 
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countries since some schemes are applied on a reciprocal basis. 102 Since 
the UK does not have a blank tape levy, UK copyright owners do not 
benefit from the other Member States' laws even though their works 
are being copied throughout Europe. l03 A harmonized law would help 
copyright holders recoup the revenue lost through home copying. 104 
Finally, a harmonized scheme would end the distortion in trade. l05 
There is a risk of unfair competition because of the different regula-
tions in Member States. 106 Currently, a purchaser in Denmark can 
simply go to Germany to take advantage of savings afforded by Ger-
many's lower levies. 107 In addition, under the current system, it would 
be possible to pay a remuneration levy in a Member State where it is 
at its lowest and escape the levy in other Member States by arguing 
that the royalties have already been paid once, and the product is 
entitled to move freely through the EU.IOS 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED DIRECTIVE 
Due to these competing arguments, the Commission continues to 
delay unveiling the draft directive to harmonize levies on blank audio 
and video tapes and recording equipment. 109 Although the press has 
reported upon the draft, the issue apparently has been dropped by the 
outgoing Internal Market Commissioner due to intense lobbying. 110 No 
new discussions have taken place. lll 
The current text of the draft directive, however, is no longer de-
signed to harmonize national legislations on home copying, but in-
stead seeks to ensure that basic provisions are implemented. ll2 Al-
102 Marshall, supra note 9. 
103Id. 
104 EU Commission Delays Vote, supra note 12. 
105 See Marshall, supra note 9. 
106 Copyright, supra note 7. 
107Torres, EU Commission, supra note 11. Danes pay an extra .37 European Currency Units 
("ECU") (45 cents) to buy a 60-minute audio tape, whereas Germans pay an extra .06 Ecus (7 
cents). Id. 
108 Copyright, supra note 7. 
109 EU Commission Delays Vote, supra note 12. 
1l0Torres, Commission Plans, supra note 37. 
III Id. 
112 Home Copying, supra note 3. The directive proposes the following rates on cassettes and 
recording equipment: (a) blank audio cassettes: .15 ECU per hour; (b) audio recording device: 
2 ECU per device; (c) blank video cassettes: .25 ECU per hour; and (d) video recording devices: 
10 ECU per device. Id. In addition, the Council can increase rates by up to 10 %. Id. 
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though the current text of the draft discusses rate levels and applicable 
products, it leaves a great deal of leeway to the Member States regard-
ing the specific features of the legislation.1!3 The question, then, is 
whether or not the Commission can introduce this directive under 
Article IOOA of the EEC Treaty.ll4 
Article IOOA applies only to legislation which constitutes harmoni-
zation measures to regulate the internal market. ll5 Measures intro-
duced under Article IOOA need only a qualified majority of the Council 
to be adopted, which is expected to be the case with this directive. ll6 
Article IOOA does not apply to fiscal measures, however, which need 
unanimity to be adopted. ll7 If the current proposal is not deemed a 
harmonization measure, then the UK, which opposes the idea of a 
levy,118 could effectively veto it.ll9 
The current draft also calls for levies to be collected by bodies 
designated by Member States from the "first purchaser" and shared 
among creators, producers and performing artists through collective 
management companies.120 Each category will receive at least twenty 
percent of the levy proceeds. 121 This is different from earlier proposals 
which were more bureaucratic and called for the creation of a clearing 
house at the EU level to distribute the collected levies. 122 
The new draft, however, allows each country to decide, within cer-
tain guidelines, how to allocate the money raised from the levies.123 
This leaves the directive open to attack by those who argue that gov-
ernment-imposed funding of cultural measures is similar to a fiscal 
measure, not a copyright measure.124 Therefore, by allowing Member 
113Id. 
114 See CASE AGAINST LEVIES, supra note 1, at 9. 
115 Id. Article 100A states, "The Council shall. .. adopt the measures for the approximation of 
the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have 
as their objective the establishing and functioning of the internal market." 'TREATY ESTABLISHING 
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY,Jan. 1, 1958, art. 100A, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [EEC Treaty]. 
116 Marshall, supra note 9. 
117 CASE AGAINST LEVIES, supra note 1, at 6. 
118 See EU Commission Delays Vote, supra note 12. 
119 See Marshall, supra note 9. 
120 Home Copying, supra note 3. 
121Id. 
122 EU Commission Delays Vote, supra note 12. 
123 All Tied Up in Brown Tape, THE INDEPENDENT, Aug. 23, 1994, available in LEXIS, World 
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States the option of implementing such a fund, the draft directive falls 
within the category of a fiscal measure and needs unanimity to be 
adopted.125 
The current draft does not contain a reciprocity clause regarding 
the basis for distribution to copyright holders in other countries.126 The 
Member States can either treat copyright holders from other countries 
the same as nationals or require reciprocity under a chosen system.127 
If the right to remuneration is subject to protection under Berne, 
which calls for national treatment, then allowing Member States to 
decide the issue of reciprocity raises serious questions about the effec-
tiveness of Berne.128 Arguably, however, a government should not pro-
vide the benefit if a majority of the money collected goes to foreign 
right owners. 129 
Finally, the draft proposes that blind and deaf people shall be exempt 
from these taxes.130 This satisfies the demand of many organizations 
who believe that the levy would unfairly penalize visually handicapped 
people. l3l This provision, however, does not answer how exemptions 
will be determined since there is no universally recognized system for 
certification of blindness or partial sight. 132 
CONCLUSION 
Home copying will continue to cause a loss of royalties for copyright 
holders. By harmonizing remuneration legislation on an EU level, the 
Member States will decrease distortion of competition and at the same 
time compensate authors for lost royalties. Although it may be an 
imperfect way to accomplish the goal, the blank tape levy is already in 
place and being enforced in nine out of the fifteen EU countries. 
There is a strong legal foundation for the remuneration under Berne. 
So, even though opponents argue that the levy is a fiscal measure, it 
has developed directly from the copyright arena. Successful implemen-
tation of EU legislation will only serve to complete the attempt to 
harmonize intellectual property rights. Finally, as long as the Commis-
125 See Marshall, supra note 9. 
126 Home Copying, supra note 3. 
127 [d. 
128 See National Treatment, supra note 69. 
129 [d. 
130 Home Copying, supra note 3. 
131 See CASE AGAINST LEVIES, supra note 1, at 28-29. 
132Jones & Wroe, supra note 34. 
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sion continues to yield to special interest groups, the draft will lack the 
basic features that an effective directive should contain. Therefore, it 
is unlikely that any directive will be adopted in this area if the Com-
mission is not willing to take a stand on the controversial issues. 
Note: Since March 1995, the Groupment European des Sociates d'Au-
teurs et Compositeurs has been urging the Commission to introduce 
a harmonized system of remuneration, but as of September 1995, the 
Commission had still failed to take any action. 
Renee L. Stasio 
